This study draws on preliminary case evidence to explore the motivations and advisability of engagement by African multinational enterprises (MNEs) in outward foreign direct investment (FDI) activities outside their home region. It complements recent research on MNEs from emerging markets, focused on the BRICS (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China, and South Africa) economies, with virtually no attention to potentially important players from rising Africa. The MNEs explored in this study are active in the energy, manufacturing, construction, chemicals, agribusiness, extractive/mining, and financial services sectors, and they have investment footprints both in countries in the North and the South. Their investment decisions are motivated by the search for market opportunities, strategic assets/resources and performance-boosting relationships, though more advanced economies appear to attract more strategic asset-seeking FDI from African MNEs. The paper argues that intra-regional investments by African MNEs should continue to be prioritized, but selective and strategic extra-regional FDI, undertaken with an eye on furthering global competitiveness, also requires appropriate policy support. This seems even more sensible given that the acceleration of borderless digital internationalization and the increasingly blurred nationality of MNE affiliates are lessening the relevance of regional distinctions.
Introduction
Outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from the developing "South", or by emerging market multinational enterprises (MNEs), have witnessed significant growth over the past few decades. The latest UNCTAD statistics put FDI from developing economies at $383 billion, approximately a quarter of the total global flows of $1.75 trillion (UNCTAD, 2017a) . These flows are buoyed by the significant outward investment by MNEs from the BRICS, particularly China. The latter's extensive footprint across Africa is well publicized, as is the considerable outlay of Asian MNEs in Latin America and the Caribbean and the rising intra-regional FDI flows in transition economies, West Asia and Africa (UNCTAD, 2012 (UNCTAD, , 2017a . Increasingly, the understandable quest for strategic assets, markets and other catch-up levers has attracted these multinationals, including State-owned enterprises (SOE), to invest, particularly through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in more advanced economies (Mathews, 2006; Kumar, 2009; Ramamurti and Singh, 2009; Birkinshaw et al., 2010; Madhok and Keyhani, 2012; Peng, 2012; Sarathy, 2013; Marchand, 2015; Rao-Nicholson et al., 2016) .
African MNEs also contribute to these South-South and South-North flows, albeit to a markedly lesser extent than the BRICS economies (BCG, 2010; Ibeh, 2013 Ibeh, , 2015 . Their contribution is reflected in the surge in the continent's overall FDI stock -from $38.9 billion in 2000 to $268.7 billion in 2016 -and its growing army of over 500 services multinationals (UNCTAD, 2015) . Notably, intra-African FDI accounted for 76 per cent of the continent's outflows that went to greenfield projects (UNCTAD, 2015) , while crossborder intra-regional M&A grew almost twentyfold, from $130 million in 2013 to $2.4 billion in 2014 (UNCTAD, 2015) . Not surprisingly, South African MNEs are dominant players in the African FDI stakes (Verhoef, 2016) , but MNEs from especially Nigeria, Togo, Morocco and Egypt, are also gaining confidence and increasingly investing outside familiar, regional, territory.
African MNEs' intra-regional investment activities, like those of their developing "South" counterparts (Aykut and Ratha, 2003) , can be explained from an evolutionary, learningby-doing or institutional proximity perspective (Buckley et al., 2007; Ibeh, 2009) . These forays may also be prompted by infrastructure developments in the region and the emergence of more integrated African markets, particularly as these serve as viable learning platforms and enablers for African companies seeking to upgrade their capabilities and skillsets to expand into more challenging advanced markets (Ibeh, 2009) . The case for African MNEs' South-North FDI is, however, more contentious, particularly given concerns in the literature about integration failures and sub-optimal value-creation arising, inter alia, from absorptive capacity limitations and institutional dissimilarities (Rugman and Li, 2007; Peng, 2012; Rao-Nicholson et al., 2016) .
The aim of the present research is to explore the motivations and advisability of African MNEs' engagement in FDI activity outside their home region. It seeks to improve understanding about the nature of extra-regional FDI, the reasons for so doing, and the policy implications from these findings. The study contributes to the continuing scholarly and policy debate about the preferred FDI destinations and growth directions of developing country MNEs (Rugman and Li, 2007; . This paper reflects on how relevant institutions, development partners and policy makers might better support African MNEs strategic investment decision-making in order to improve their impact on their home and regional economies. The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents a brief review of the literature pertaining to the issues raised and outlines relevant research questions. An explanation of the case study approach adopted is provided in section three. This is followed by the presentation, analysis and discussion of case material. The final section summarizes the findings and discusses the public policy, economic development and future research implications. It should be noted that for the purposes of this study, FDI by North African MNEs within the Middle East and North African (MENA) region are not considered extra-regional, given these MNEs' connectedness to both Africa and the Middle East.
Literature review and research questions
The classic explanations for MNEs' choice of investment destination are fourfold: market-seeking (to access potentially lucrative foreign market opportunities); resourceseeking (to access potentially advantageous resources located abroad); efficiencyseeking (to exploit favourable cost structures, efficiencies or scale economies abroad); and strategic asset-seeking (to access assets that will enable the firm to compete in a particular market, and which can include knowledge/technology-and relationshipseeking motivations) (Dunning, 1993; Mirza, 2000; Ibeh et al., 2004) .
The more traditional of these motives, market-, resource-and efficiency-seeking, can be traced to the asset exploitation logic of early international business scholars (Hymer 1960; Caves, 1971 ) -echoed by the resource-based view (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991) which explains FDI as a means of optimizing quasi-monopolistic advantages possessed by MNEs over indigenous competitors. Such advantages, subsequently reframed as ownership, location and internalization advantages (OLI) (Dunning, 1977) or firmspecific assets (FSA) (Rugman, 1980) , are thought to underpin MNEs' search for market opportunities, resources and efficiencies via FDI. Later research, mainly on developing country MNEs, broadened the spectrum of advantages to encompass relationship and network advantages (Dunning, 1993) , country-specific advantages, institutions (Dunning and Lundan, 2008) and government support (Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2008) . Significantly, this later research stream posits asset exploitation and "O1" advantages as more relevant to explaining FDI by traditional MNEs than that of their emerging market counterparts. The latter, the argument goes, tend to be more focused on augmenting or seeking strategic assets, including knowledge, technology, intellectual property, brands, reputation or prestige, and critical relationships/networks (Mathews, 2002 (Mathews, , 2006 Aulakh 2007; Luo and Tung, 2007; Amighini et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2012; Gaffney et al., 2014) , particularly as they move up the value chain into more complex and higher value-added activities. The Linkage-Leverage-Learning (LLL) framework postulated by Mathews (2002 Mathews ( , 2006 aptly reflects this asset-augmentation perspective.
The foregoing should not be interpreted as implying that emerging country MNEs only seek access to strategic assets through their FDI activities. On the contrary, classic FDI motivations, specifically the quest for markets, resources and efficiencies, are also relevant (Amighini et al., 2010; Yeganeh, 2016) . The literature, to be sure, offers countless examples of market-seeking FDI by emerging country MNEs, for example Chinese firms' push into Japan and Southeast Asia (Frost, 2004) , the expansion into Eastern Europe by firms of the Russian Federation (Vahtra and Liuhto, 2004) and South African MNEs' expansion into other African markets (Klein and Wocke, 2007; Vorheof, 2016) . These MNEs -even those with sizeable and rapidly-growing domestic marketsare known to explore new foreign markets to gain the competitive edge over domestic rivals, get closer to customers and obtain knowledge about foreign markets. Resourceseeking motivations, including the search for raw materials and labour (De Beule and Duanmu, 2012) , are also amply illustrated by Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Indian FDI in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere (Casanova, 2004; Goldstein, 2006; Buckley et al., 2007) . Although efficiency-seeking factors seemed to be of less interest to emerging market MNEs -which traditionally faced lower costs thanks to access to cheap labour, abundant natural resources, and government support -rising competition in domestic and international markets appears to be changing this situation. There is evidence, for example, of emerging market MNEs outsourcing certain functions to cut production costs (Sim and Pandian, 2003) or expanding to advanced countries in pursuit of scale economies (e.g. Tata Group's acquisition of Anglo-Dutch steel group, Corus -Goldstein, 2008) . Enhanced national prestige, or the desire to project their corporate identity onto the world stage, have also been identified as motivational factors among emerging MNEs, particularly those supported by their national governments (Gaffney et al., 2014) .
The investment location theory for developing economy MNEs -specifically from the perspective of the evolutionary, learning-by-doing, demand similarity, psychic distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) and institutional proximity (Rugman and Li, 2007) factorsessentially recommends priority attention to intra-regional and other Southern economies given their better fit with the institutional characteristics and resource profiles familiar to developing economy MNEs. Arita (2013) , for example, attributed the higher presence of developing economy-derived FDI in the Global South to such broadly proximate institutional factors across developing markets.
1 The literature, indeed, suggests that developing country MNEs with market-seeking motivations tend to gravitate towards difficult institutional environments, where they have an advantage over their developed country peers, because they are more familiar with such institutional conditions (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; De Beule and Duanmu, 2012) . On the other hand, those that seek strategic assets appear to favour more advanced economies (Citigroup, 2005; UNCTAD, 2005; Goldstein, 2006; Amighini et al., 2010) .
2 This means in their germane search for both catch-up strategic assets and market opportunities, some developing country MNEs concurrently invest in advanced and developing economies (Yeganeh, 2016) .
From the perspective of the home country, the existing research shows a mixed impact from outward-oriented internationalization, including outsourcing and FDI, on home economies: direct positive (e.g. overseas profits); direct negative (e.g. loss of jobs and tax income); and indirect positive (e.g. cost savings resulting from optimal allocative efficiency or the so-called "batting average" effect associated with a lower cost location [Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; Bitzer and Gorg, 2005] ). Outward FDI has been found to make a positive contribution to domestic total factor productivity, through spillover effects from accessing foreign R&D, capital stock, local knowledge, public infrastructure and leveraging agglomerative effects in target countries (Hejazi and Pauly, 2003) , and through technological and skill upgrading at home. Research also suggests that the impact of outward investment may vary according to the type of industry or technological intensity (Bitzer and Gorg, 2005) , the underlying motivation for the investment (Driffield and Love, 2007) , and the location of the investment (Bitzer and Gorg, 2005) among other factors. Evidence, for example, suggests that outward FDI in certain high technology sectors tends to lead to effective technology transfer and productivity gains at home. As noted earlier, such strategic asset-seeking FDI or "home-base augmenting" FDI (Chung and Yeaple, 2004; Driffield and Love, 2007) are increasingly common, but their outcomes may depend on factors, including the location of the investment activity, the investing firm's absorptive capacity, and the extent of institutional similarity/divergence between the investing firm and host economy.
The foregoing review of the literature raises the following questions, which are explored in the present study: 
Research context and methodology
The foregoing research questions are addressed using a case study approach (Miles and Hubermann, 1994; Yin, 2003) , which is motivated by the distinctly limited extant knowledge on the FDI behaviour of African companies, South Africa excluded. It also responds to repeated calls for more qualitative approaches in international business research (Ghauri, 2004; Welch and Piekkari, 2017) , and has been successfully employed in studying emerging market MNEs from other regions (e.g. Sim and Pandian, 2003; Del Sol and Kogan, 2004) . To ensure proper case research protocols and minimize weaknesses, the following steps were pursued.
First, the study scope includes all Africa 3 , but excludes South Africa, one of the BRICS economies with several well-established global players (Klein and Wocke, 2007; Verhoef, 2016) . This delimitation also serves to draw attention to the significant level of outward FDI activity from the rest of the continent. The increased investment outflows originate partly from a new generation of innovative and ambitious African champions (KPMG 2013) and pan-African groups, notably from Nigeria, Togo, and Morocco (IMF, 2015) . A recent report to the World Bank identifies nascent African MNEs as originating from Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Togo and Uganda, and mainly operative in the financial services, extractive, construction and manufacturing sectors (Ibeh, 2013 (Ibeh, , 2015 . Kenyan investors are also strongly active in the East African region (Ngugi, 2016) . In addition to increasing levels of intra-African investment (UNCTAD, 2015) , investment outflows from Africa are also directed further afield to other Southern economies and more advanced economies, mainly in Europe and North America (Ibeh, 2013 (Ibeh, , 2015 .
Second, drawing upon relevant best practice, the study population was defined to encompass African MNEs that have undertaken FDI and own or control value-adding activities in at least two countries outside Africa. Nine companies -not an exhaustive list -were selected for investigation, to ensure that the findings are not idiosyncratic (Miles and Hubermann, 1994) .
Third, secondary data from multiple sources, including electronic databases, national and supranational organizations, company websites and reports and business press, were examined for relevant insights on the firms under survey. The present study's scope is limited and therefore precludes theory testing or generalizability. However, it allows for the exploration of theory (Yin, 2003) and the generation of insight into African MNEs, by drawing on the aforementioned data sources. Extensive desk-based research enabled the development of case narratives, chronological timelines and information about the study firms' major FDI activities. The integration of multiple sources produced a patchwork of evidence, in the best tradition of case study research (Yin, 2003) . The foregoing aligns with earlier calls in the literature for a greater integration of secondary data sources in international business research (Mol and Birkinshaw, 2014; Puolis et al., 2013) , particularly as they "… provide empirical depth into a case-study project" (Puolis et al., 2013, p. 331 Orascom Construction Industries (OCI), founded in 1950 and controlled by the Sawiris family, is one of Egypt's largest corporations, employing 12,000 (core) staff in 18 countries across the Middle East and Africa, Europe, North America, and Asia. It specializes in large industrial construction and infrastructure and fertilizer businesses and operates through major subsidiaries, including the OCI Construction Group, which provides international engineering and construction services for public and private clients, primarily on infrastructure, industrial and high-end commercial projects in the MENA region and Europe. The OCI Fertilizer Group, based in the Netherlands, ranks among the world's top fertilizer producers. It owns and operates nitrogen fertilizer plants in Egypt, Algeria, the Netherlands, the United States, and an international distribution platform spanning from the Americas to Asia. Latest available figures (2016) suggest annual revenues of $4bn, before-tax profit of $145 million. OCI generates most of its revenue outside Egypt and this is likely to continue based on the Group's intensifying international investments, including acquisitions and joint ventures (JVs). Table 2 offers more profile information on OCI, including sample FDI milestones and footprint. sectors of the petroleum industry, with additional interests in telecommunications, insurance and financial services and the training of oil industry professionals. It is a highly diversified conglomerate with more than 30 units and JV activities across Africa, South East Asia, Europe and North America. It generated $10 billion in revenue and $436 million in pre-tax profit, with 8,000 staff in 2016. Seemingly driven to become a significant international competitor, particularly in the African context, Sonangol has undertaken strategic investments both domestically and internationally. The latter include China Other Assets -Nigeria, Indonesia, and Argentina.
Source: Case Data.
phase of its intra-regional expansion focused mainly on neighbouring countries and francophone West Africa, while the second phase of African expansion, heralded by the acquisition of Barclays Egypt, prioritized such selection criteria as size of the national economy, population and growth prospects. Table 7 .
Ecobank Transnational Incorporated, established in 1985 by private and institutional investors from several African countries, reputedly has the broadest reach of any African bank. It employed almost 16,000 staff, across 1250 branches across 33 African and four non-African countries, and generated revenue of $1.8 billion and profits before tax of $182 million in 2017. Ranked number one by asset in seven African markets, among the top three in fourteen others, and listed on three West African Stock Exchanges, Ecobank commenced FDI activity in 1989 and has expanded largely through the acquisition of existing banks in various countries. First Bank Holding, which was founded in 1894, has interests in commercial and investment banking, asset management, insurance and other financial services. In 2016, it employed some 9,000 staff in 862 business locations across 12 countries, including eight African and four non-African markets. Its profit before tax was $63.6 million. First Bank Holding is listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange and London Stock Exchange. Its acquisition of Anglo-African Bank in 1912 was reportedly the first ever M&A recorded in this region (FBN Holdings, 2014) , and this was followed by entry into the United Kingdom in 1982 and later FDI activities in a number of African countries, France, China, and the United Arab Emirates.
From the above it is evident that the case subjects are significant multinational actors. The analysis now turns to the focal questions raised in the present research, as outlined at the end of the literature review section. 
African MNEs' Extra-regional FDI: Where? Why?
The above overview shows that African MNEs' outward FDI activities have mainly been intra-regionally focused. That said, there is also considerable evidence of outward FDI to other Southern economies and advanced economies in the North. This concurs with a report, which puts rising Africa's outward FDI to Southern and advanced economies at 17 and 15 per cent respectively (Ibeh, 2013) . The analysis below focuses on these two types of extra-regional FDI.
In absence of a commonly agreed definition and classification system of which countries belong to the "global North" and the "global South" or "economies of the South" and "economies of the North", the following operationalization was employed. Based on UNCTAD's classification of developed, developing and transition countries (UNCTAD, 2017b) and in line with UN ESCAP (2009) understanding of the "South" and the "North", developing and transition countries in this study are denoted as "economies of the South" and developed countries as "economies of the North". With regard to the motivation for these South-South FDI activities, the case material summarized in Box 1 points to the particular relevance of market-seeking motivations. Examples abound, including:
• Sonatrach International Holding's 1994 establishment of a Singaporean subsidiary to market LPG, crude and other products in the Asia/Pacific market and an LNG marketing agreement with Russia's Gazprom, the world's largest exporter of natural gas;
• OCI's investment in a JV in Brazil (with FITCO International S.A, a Brazilian fertilizer trading company) in order to trade and distribute fertilizer products and import urea from its Fertilizer Group;
• OCP's investment in Black Sea Fertilizer trading company, a JV with Turkish Toros Agri-industry, seeking to extend its presence to Central Asia and the Balkans; There are also indications that resource-seeking motivations influenced some of the direct investments undertaken by African MNEs in other Southern economies (Box 2). This is illustrated by OCP and Sonatrach's respective investments in a Pakistani plant that produces phosphate fertilizers and phosphoric acid and Peru's Camisea upstream gas project; as well as Sonangol's investments in exploration rights in Iraq and Cuba.
Box 1. Motivations for African MNEs' South-South Investments: Market-seeking
• Sonatrach International Holding's subsidiaries, including SPC Singapore, were reportedly set up to market Algerian LPG, crude and other products in the Asia/ Pacifi c market.
• Ecobank's representative offi ces in Beijing and Dubai were respectively positioned to facilitate the growing trade links between China and Africa, and develop market presence in an increasingly important regional hub and emerging fi nancial centre.
• First Bank similarly has a representative offi ce in China.
• OCP's JV with Turkish Toros Agri-industry, the Black Sea Fertilizer trading company reportedly aimed to extend the company's market presence to Central Asia and the Balkans;
• OCI's JV with Brazil's FITCO International was reportedly aimed at facilitating the trading and distribution of OCI Fertilizer Group's products. OCI's partnership with Indian infrastructure company, HCC Infrastructure Limited, was also focused on pursuing revenue generating PPP and Build-Operate-Transfer projects in India.
• Elsewedy's JVs with Arab Contractors and the Pakistani government in Iraq and Pakistan respectively were aimed at accessing market opportunities.
• Sonangol's Singapore subsidiary, SonAsia, was reportedly set up in 2004 to sell Angola's crudes to the Asian continent.
Sonatrach's exploration and production agreement with Russia's Gazprom also reflects a resource-seeking focus.
Investments in economies of the North targeted opportunities in the following host countries: Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. BCP, Attijariwafa, Sonatrach, Sonangol, Elsewedy and OCI have been particularly expansive, with each invested in five or more advanced economies. This level of exposure to more competitive and mature global markets underlines the international commitment of these African MNEs. The United Kingdom, France and Spain are among the most common advanced-economy destinations for African investments, which reflect the influence of historical and cultural ties on the investment location decisions of African MNEs. Nigerian financial service MNEs, e.g. First Bank, have invested in the United Kingdom, while Moroccan MNEs -BCP and Attijariwafa -have targeted Spain and France, and the United Kingdom to a lesser extent. The Netherlands and the United States are also frequently targeted.
A close look at the case material summarized in Boxes 3, 4 and 5 suggests the search for strategic assets/resources, new market opportunities and value-enhancing relationships to be the main motivations for these MNEs' foreign investment activities. The quest for strategic assets largely explains Elsewedy's acquisition of the Spanish wind energy firm, M Torres Olvega, principally to leverage the acquired entity's capabilities in manufacturing wind turbines and providing co-development, operation and maintenance services for wind farms as well as set the stage for the subsequent establishment of Sewedy Wind Energy Group (SWEG). Similar technology leveraging or asset exploitation also appears to explain Elsewedy's entry into a JV with German company SIAG, a producer of steel and tube towers. The towers are the main component required by Elsewedy for wind turbine installations in its home market. OCP's investments in phosphate fertilizer and phosphoric acid production plants in Belgium and France assists to diversify its supply chain and to secure access to critical sources; while Sonangol's acquisition of US-based Cobalt International Energy helps diversify and extend its offshore oil Box 2. Motivations for African MNEs' South-South Investments: Resource-seeking
• Sonatrach's exploration and production agreement with Russia's Gazprom and propane hydrogenation JVs in Turkey were reportedly aimed at enhancing its access to critical resources and increasing overall production capacity. So was its JV in the upstream Camisea gas project in Peru.
• OCP's JVs in Pakistani and Indian plants that produce phosphate fertilizers and phosphoric acid were similarly focused on sustaining its access to critical resources and boosting overall capacity. The same goes for Sonangol's investments in exploration rights in Iraq and Cuba. Market-seeking motivations also abound. Sonatrach International Holding's whollyowned trading units in London and Amsterdam -respectively Sonatrach Petroleum Corporation and Sonatrading Amsterdam -were both set up to market piped gas and LNG to Europe and the American LNG market. Elsewedy's acquisition of ZPA Smart Energy, a Czech manufacturer with clients such as E.ON and CEZ was predominantly driven by market-orientated considerations. Another example is Sonatrach's whollyowned finance and investment Dutch subsidiary, Sonatrach Petroleum Investment Corporation and its financial holding unit, International Petroleum Investment Partnership, which respectively focus on helping Sonatrach expand, consolidate and integrate its overseas operations and strategic subsidiaries, including through E&P ventures, associated logistics and services and the management of Sonatrach's portfolio. Ecobank subsidiaries in France and London, and First Bank's subsidiary in the Box 3. Motivations for African MNEs' South-North Investments: Strategic assets/ resource-seeking
• Elsewedy's acquisition of the Spanish wind energy fi rm, M Torres Olvega, was reportedly aimed at leveraging the capabilities of a reputable manufacturer of wind turbines and service for wind farms in its subsequent establishment of Sewedy Wind Energy Group (SWEG). Such technology leveraging was also observed in Elsewedy's JV with German steel maker SIAG, which produces tube towers, the main component required by Elsewedy for wind turbine installations in its home market., and in Sonatrach's propane de-hydrogenation JV in Northern Spain with BASF of Germany.
• OCI's acquisition, via wholly-owned OCI Nitrogen (Netherlands), of an integrated ammonia-methanol plant in Beaumont, Texas, and of MICRO Chemie B.V., which own major assets in the Netherlands (including 30,000-ton ammonia storage tanks, a port terminal and Royal DSM''s Agro and Melamine businesses) were reportedly focused on procuring strategically important assets.
• Sonangol acquisition of America's Cobalt International Energy's oil blocks in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, US, in exchange for 40% of two blocks offshore of Angola, was reportedly aimed at diversifying Sonangol's oil and gas supply base. So was OCP's investments in phosphate fertilizers and phosphoric acid production plants in Belgium and France.
United Kingdom and a branch in Paris, appear motivated by the need to develop market presence in these key financial centres.
Relationship-seeking motivations evidently underlie African banks' expansion into Europe, North America and other major host countries of African immigrant communities. These financial service MNEs typically seek to develop relationships in these markets with the diaspora and organizations with links to Africa, or seek to initiate such links.
The case material above all point to market-, strategic resource-and relationshipseeking motives, or a combination of these motives, for African MNEs' investment decisions abroad. The MNEs pursued their market-seeking objectives by investing in revenue-generating platforms in both the emerging South and the advanced North. The MNEs, notably Elsewedy, OCI and the extractive industry giants, Sonatrach, Sonangol and OCP, also manifested their strategic-asset/resourceseeking orientation by augmenting assets in both developing and advanced economies. The present study, while limited in scope, suggests that African MNEs with primarily strategic asset-and relationship-seeking motivations largely favour upmarket, advanced economy destinations, while those whose motivations are predominantly market-seeking tend to prioritize intra-regional and Southern market opportunities. The tendency, however, may vary by industry. Oil and gas MNEs, for • BCP's representative offi ce in Washington was reportedly positioned as a "link between non-Resident Moroccans and their country of origin as well as to contribute to strengthening business relationships between Morocco and the USA".
• Elsewedy's acquisition of Czech ZPA Smart Energy was reportedly infl uenced by the type of clients served by the latter, including major power companies, CEZ, PRE, & E. ON and CR
• Among Sonatrach International Holding's many subsidiaries are Sonatrach Petroleum Corporation and Sonatrading, both wholly-owned trading units respectively based in London and Amsterdam, with responsibility for marketing piped gas and LNG to Europe and America.
• OCI's acquisition of the Weitz Company, an Iowa-based US general contractor, and long-term off-take agreement with the Methanex Corporation for output from OCI's methanol plant in Beaumont, Texas are reportedly aimed securing and strengthening access to US market opportunities.
example, are largely bound to pursue extra-regional markets given the inadequate level of demand for their main products intra-regionally. Not surprisingly, efficiencyseeking motivation appears not to be particularly salient in the extra-regional FDI activities of African MNEs. Elsewedy's investment in production facilities in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, however, offer the closest example.
How advisable is African MNEs' engagement in extra-regional FDI?
As might be expected, there are credible arguments in favour of, and against, African MNEs investing outside their home region. Some of the key considerations are presented below.
On the positive side, upmarket FDI can facilitate African MNEs' access to critical technologies, knowledge capabilities and related strategic assets thereby assisting them to augment, upgrade and catch up. This aligns with the LLL framework by Mathews (2002 Mathews ( , 2006 . Notably, Elsewedy's initial foothold in the increasingly important wind energy business and the development of the Sewedy Wind Energy Group would seem to have stemmed from its acquisition of a Spanish specialist provider of wind turbines and wind farms, M Torres Olvega. The JV with SIAG of Germany, a producer of steel and tube towers, similarly availed Elsewedy of critical capabilities for manufacturing tube towers required for wind turbine installation projects in its home market. This, interestingly, suggests some additionality from extra-regional FDI to augment Elsewedy's home market, echoing evidence from previous emerging economy MNE research, notably related to Chinese MNEs, about the leveraging of acquired entities to bolster operations at home (Yueh, 2012 There is another important sense in which such extra-regional investments widen the strategic and market options available to African MNEs: this is by enabling them to seek diversified market opportunities further afield, in more lucrative, albeit competitive, advanced economies. Such market diversification arguably limits future revenue exposure to any one region or geographic market clusters. This tends to be particularly important when situations within their home region (e.g. the Arab Spring, civil conflicts, economic recession, etc.) narrow the range and size of opportunities available to these firms locally or regionally, or even present risk to their operations. OCI, for example, appeared to have mitigated some of the effects of the post-Arab Spring-related challenges in its home country by realigning its global structure and shifting organizational emphasis away from Egypt and toward international subsidiaries, notably in The Netherlands and the United States (Iowa and the Gulf of Mexico). Notably, its Construction Group reportedly secured a turnkey engineering, procurement and construction contract worth over $1 billion from an acquired entity, the Iowa Fertilizer Company, in 2012. The reported increase in revenue generated from Europe, North America and other regions (e.g. 78 per cent increase in the Asian segment) evidently mitigated the overall decline in OCI financial outcomes during the particularly challenging 2011-2013 period. OCI Fertilizer Holdings' reported disposal of its 16.8 per cent stake in the US-based Gavillion Group to the Japanese Marubeni Corporation for over $600 million, at a hefty premium on the $340 million purchasing price three years earlier, was similarly helpful.
Arguments against extra-regional FDI, however, also prevail. For instance, some contend that expansion to intra-regional markets tends to yield comparable or better market diversification benefits. The significant boost reportedly achieved by Elsewedy from the infrastructure boom and attendant demand for housing, power generation, cables and other electrical products in the neighbouring Gulf Cooperation Council countries could be cited for illustrative purposes. Elsewedy's intensified post-Arab Spring targeting of parts of the MENA region and the African continent, where rising demand for electricity was creating opportunities and boosting revenues in the medium term (e.g. through a share of a $1 billion deal to repair Libyan armed conflict-damaged electricity grid and Business, 2017] ). Extra-regional FDI ambitions also tend to ignore the widely noted struggles of developing country MNEs to integrate acquired upmarket entities and capture value. The lowering of OCI Iowa subsidiary's revenue bonds, from BB-minus to B-plus, by Fitch Ratings, reportedly owing to escalating costs and construction delays is an example of such upmarket FDI snags, as is Attajariwafa CEO's bemoaning the higher associated costs and regulatory burden of operating a "fully French bank" (Euromoney, 2013) .
From the above it is obvious that the advisability or otherwise of African MNEs' involvement in direct investment outside their home region is not an easily resolved matter. The next and final section of the paper seeks to draw some conclusions.
Summary, conclusions and implications
This paper has presented and discussed preliminary evidence on the extra-regional FDI activities of African MNEs, and explored the motivations for these investments. It captures the tentative steps of these MNEs in South-South and South-North investment contexts and contributes to the global discourse on the merits or otherwise of extraregional FDI, including probable additionality for home economies. These MNEs' forays beyond their intra-regional markets in search of market opportunities, strategic assets/ resources and value enhancing relationships are welcome, and concerted policy efforts are needed to support their sustainability. Although not always consistent, previous studies on the impact of FDI on home economies largely suggest favourable net effects on employment, technological and managerial knowledge transfer, among others (Hejazi and Pauly, 2003; Bitzer and Gorg, 2005; Buckley et al., 2007; Moran, 2007) . Arguments against extra-regional FDI are not without merit, however, a more holistic and strategic view ought to factor in the positive concomitants of direct exposure to more advanced markets. These include learning/technology spillovers, access to "wealthier" markets, the opportunity to acquire strategic assets/resources, as well as the associated opportunity of engaging with and embedding global best practice . Intra-regional investments by African MNEs should continue to be favoured, but selective and strategic extra-regional FDI, undertaken with an eye to enhancing global competitiveness, also requires appropriate policy support. Indeed, the increasing importance of the digital economy, with its vastly enhanced facilities for borderless digital internationalization (UNCTAD, 2017a; Ibeh and Lloyd-Reason, 2017), and the proliferation of MNE affiliates with blurred national identities or "multiple passports" (UNCTAD, 2016) are making regional distinctions less relevant.
Policy makers should guide African MNEs to prioritize the acquisition of advantagegenerating capabilities, including habitual upgrading, continuing innovation and continuous learning . Such foregrounding and capability anchors on the home and regional fronts would help them, in time, to develop breakthrough brand reputation, or augment their brand equity to a level that neutralizes the effects of unfavourable country-of-origin perceptions. It could also attract valueseeking private equity firms to partner with them to effectively reach global markets. White elephant, prestige-seeking multinational expansion, driven mainly by ego and puff, with questionable firm-specific capability anchors, should rightly be discouraged. However, policy makers must not shy away from championing ambitious upstarts and global start-ups, including digital economy entrepreneurs with the vision and strategic intent to take on the world and occupy a global niche. To do otherwise is to deny the possibility that the next game changers might emerge from the developing world, including Africa. This is particularly important given the vast and increasing opportunities that the digital economy and digital internationalization present to firms of divergent demographics and geographies (UNCTAD, 2016; Ibeh and Lloyd-Reason, 2017 ).
Development promotion institutions, including multilateral global and regional development partners, African regional bodies, UN agencies (e.g. UNCTAD) and the World Bank Group, should steer and support African governments and policy makers towards embracing an appropriately nuanced outward-oriented development strategy. This ought to entail, inter alia, working with and assisting these actors to establish or upgrade their investment policy infrastructure, including in-house capacity for investment policy making, and redressing the mixed policy signals so often given on outward FDI. African governments that are yet to enter into appropriate bilateral and multilateral investment treaties should also be encouraged to take the necessary steps in that regard in order to obviate unfair treatment of their current and future MNEs and negotiate their access to as level a playing field as possible (Ibeh, 2013; UNCTAD, 2017b) . African governments and policy makers should also be assisted to craft a template that can be used to evaluate and distinguish between African firms based on their readiness to undertake FDI -intra-regionally or extra-regionally. Such a template should guide the design and provision of appropriately tailored support to African firms ready to invest abroad. This is likely to advance the crucial task of prioritizing scarce support resources to African companies with better prospects of generating net positive benefits to their home economies.
Researchers and policy makers are challenged to continue efforts to understand the net impact of African MNEs' outward investment on their home countries, regions and relevant parties, such as diaspora communities. Improved understanding of additionality and net effects could fruitfully advance scholarly discussions and managerial and policy decision making, whilst also informing the design and deployment of assistance programmes by stakeholders.
